Please check the examination details below before entering your candidate information

Candidate surname	Other names

Centre Number | Candidate Number

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level

Time 2 hours

Paper reference **WHI04/1D**

History

International Advanced

PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

You must have:
Extracts Booklet (enclosed)

Total Marks

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and **ONE** question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
  – *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
  – *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ▶

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SECTION A

Answer Question 1. Write your answers in the spaces provided.

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

1 How far do you agree with the view that during the advance north of the 38th parallel by UN forces, in October–November 1950, General MacArthur recklessly disregarded instructions?

Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(25)

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(Total for Question 1 = 25 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 25 MARKS

SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

EITHER

2 How far do you agree that, in the years 1945–54, the most significant influence on the development of the Cold War in South-East Asia was the Communist victory in China in 1949?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

OR

3 How accurate is it to say that under President Kennedy there was a definite change in US policy towards Vietnam compared to US policy towards Vietnam under President Eisenhower?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)

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Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number: **Question 2** ☐ **Question 3** ☐

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TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS

TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS

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Extracts Booklet

Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.

Turn over ▶

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Extracts for use with Section A.

Extract 1: From M Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: Far Eastern General*, published in 1989.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorised MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel with the objective of destroying all Communist forces. They said MacArthur could continue operations so long as no signs existed of Soviet or Chinese intervention, and with the understanding that only South Korean troops should be used near to the northern border. MacArthur interpreted US State Department encouragement as a licence to act as he wished.

As the war progressed, MacArthur revealed some important disagreements with his own government. MacArthur claimed the authority to 'immediately unleash his air force' against China, if China entered the war. He appeared eager to engage in a war of 'liberation'.

MacArthur was extremely confident. At the Wake Island conference with President Truman, MacArthur took the lead by predicting a quick end to the war.

Truman's military and diplomatic advisers continued to worry about MacArthur's plans and behaviour. General Bradley felt MacArthur's decisions appeared the triumph of vanity over good sense. MacArthur hoped a bold strike against the enemy would bring headlines highlighting his military genius.

MacArthur disregarded orders to utilise only South Korean forces along the Chinese border. On 24 October he announced his intention of utilising all ground forces available to secure all of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs mildly requested an explanation. MacArthur explained that he interpreted earlier instructions merely as a statement of broad policy, not a final order.

Extract 2: From R E Neustadt, *The Exercise of Presidential Power*, published in 1972.

MacArthur's northward march had been approved by the UN, but with limitations on his actions. Truman promptly abandoned the major limitation. On 8 October, the second day of the general advance past the 38th parallel, Truman approved new instructions to MacArthur. These instructions were proposed by the Joint Chiefs, endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and agreed by the Secretary of State. If Chinese Communist units were found in Korea, MacArthur was authorised to continue his actions, as long as, in his judgement, there was a reasonable chance of success. It was now delegated to the judgement of MacArthur to decide what was meant by 'reasonable'. The only limitation left was the number of forces available to him.

In the weeks to come, MacArthur would misjudge the circumstances with tragic consequences, but it cannot be claimed that he exceeded his instructions. Nothing said by anybody at Wake Island on 15 October put limits on these instructions to MacArthur; indeed, there was enormous confidence shown in him. Nothing said in public on the President's return to the US weakened the US commitment to a unified Korea. The Wake Island communiqué, Truman's San Francisco speech and his address to the UN, all added weight and definiteness to the war aim and confirmed the policy as Truman's own. The discretion given to MacArthur in October contributed directly to the disaster in November.

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